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ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The District Court Erred When It Ruled That The Location Of The Car Keys Determined
Whether The Recently Driven Car Was Subject To The Automobile Exception
The district court erroneously found that the automobile exception did not apply
because Ms. Morton, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked car, claimed not to
have the keys to the car. (See R., p. 239.) The district court found that: “The most
persuasive evidence here is that Penkunis had the keys to the vehicle and Morton was
therefore unable to drive it. This made the vehicle not readily mobile and, therefore, not
subject to the automobile exception.” (Id.) The lack of a readily available key does not
render a vehicle “not readily mobile” for the purposes of the automobile exception.
“Under the long-recognized automobile exception, police officers having probable
cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may
search the automobile without a warrant.” State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d
210, 212 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). “The two primary justifications for the
automobile exception are mobility and a reduced expectation of privacy.”

State v.

Lovely, 159 Idaho 675, 677, 365 P.3d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied (Feb. 23,
2016) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–393 (1985); State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 281–282, 108 P.3d 424, 428–429 (Ct. App. 2005)). Both of the primary
justifications for the automobile exception are present here. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 612.)
In his response brief, Penkunis argues that the district court did not err because the
lack of keys is an objective indicia of immobility. (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-10
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(citing State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 808-809, 339 P.3d 1207, 1212-1213 (Ct. App.
2014)). The holding, and facts, in Gosch do not support his argument, because the car in
Gosch was deemed readily mobile even though it was parked in Gosch’s driveway with
no indication that there was a driver, let alone keys, in the car. See Gosch, 157 Idaho at
805, 339 P.3d at 1209.
In Gosch, the police executed a search warrant to search Gosch’s apartment and
his black Jeep. Gosch, 157 Idaho at 805, 339 P.3d at 1209. While the police were
executing the search warrant, a drug detection dog alerted on a sedan parked in Gosch’s
driveway. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the alert by the drug dog provided probable
cause to believe the sedan contained controlled substances, and that the issue was whether
the sedan was “readily mobile.” See id. at 807-809, 339 P.3d at 1211-1213. “[T]he test
for whether a vehicle parked in a residential area is mobile for purposes of the automobile
exception is whether, viewed objectively, there was any indication that the vehicle was
not mobile.” Id. at 808-809, 339 P.3d at 1212-1213. “Absent some objective indicia of
immobility, an automobile is presumed to be mobile.” Id. at 809, 339 P.3d at 1213. The
sedan was found stationary in a place regularly used for residential purposes, and there
was no indicia of immobility; therefore, the sedan was properly searched under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
In Gosch, the parked car was determined to be “readily mobile” even though “no
officer had seen it move.” Id. at 808, 339 P.3d at 1212. While the Gosch Court did not
explicitly state there was no driver in the car, the factual implication is clear, that the car
was sitting unattended in Gosch’s driveway. If a parked car, which no officer had seen
2

move, and is unattended, is deemed to be “readily mobile” then a car parked on the street
with someone who admitted the car was recently driven sitting in the driver’s seat, is
“readily mobile” regardless of the location of the keys.
If the presence of keys were necessary to make a vehicle readily mobile, there is
no possibility that parked and unoccupied vehicles which have repeatedly been held to be
“readily mobile” could be determined to be “readily mobile.” See Gosch, 157 Idaho at
808-809, 339 P.3d at 1212-1213; United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1987); see also W. La Fave,
3 Search & Seizure § 7.2(b) (5th ed., 2017) (“The Hepperle position that it is appearances
and not the actual condition of the vehicle that counts is not only eminently sound, but
also squares completely with the [California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)] reference to
‘the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being
used for transportation.’”).
The location of the keys does not control the analysis. Even after an automobile
has been impounded and is in the custody of the police, the police may conduct a search
pursuant to the automobile exception, provided they have probable cause. See Michigan
v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (“It is thus clear that the justification to conduct
such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it
depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that
the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with,
during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.”); see also United States v.
Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Gallman argues that after his arrest the
3

automobile was not readily mobile because he had been arrested and the agents had his
key. These circumstances do indeed make the car less accessible to Gallman, but they do
not make it less mobile.”). Whether the police have ascertained the location of the keys is
not a perquisite to a determination that the car is readily mobile. The police do not have
to find the keys to the car before searching it pursuant to the automobile exception.
The district court incorrectly applied the law to the facts when it held that the lack
of keys in the immediate vicinity of the car made it immobile and the automobile
exception did not apply.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s decision to
suppress and this case be remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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